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Abstract 
The paper is an account of the development of laboratory experimental methods in the early 
1970s as influenced by the fields of Public Choice and Social Choice. Just a few key experiments 
conducted during a period when no experimental markets research was taking place, provide a 
bridge with the subsequent, rapid, growth of experimental economics. A new focus on public 
goods and externalities, as opposed to private goods traditionally used in economics experiments, 
required new representations of the commodity space and preference inducement methods. The 
importance of voting and collective decision making processes dictated the testing of equilibrium 
concepts from political science and cooperative game theory. 
 
The introduction of Public Choice topics in the 1970s was a major transition in the use of 
laboratory experimental methods as applied to economics and political science. The transition 
can be recognized by the change in the focus of laboratory experiments from private sector 
phenomena (markets, oligopoly, matrix games), to the public sector and by the substantial 
                                                      
1 The comments of Roger Congleton, Morris Fiorina, and Andrej Svorencik are gratefully acknowledged. 
 
 
increase in the number of papers written and topics explored. The methods changed to 
encompass a different approach to experimental methods, a new set of theories, a focus on 
institutional detail and new environments as well as a new approach to policy.  
The transition took place within a narrow window of time during the first half of the 
1970s when results were produced and disseminated (actual publication of many results occurred 
years later due to the long publication lag). At first, it was only me, my colleagues, and my 
students guided by my close connection to Public Choice. It quickly expanded to include other 
members of the Caltech faculty because several were interested in Public Choice and to Carnegie 
Mellon where Public Choice research was active. After those first few years, the growth was 
rapid, fueled by regular meetings of the Public Choice society where results were reported, 
enhanced by connections with axiomatic social choice and the decades earlier work on 
experimental markets  and given visibility by special conferences in 1977 and 1978 where 
fundamental experimental papers were presented. Subsequently, a renewed interest in policy, 
created an overlap and partnership with experimental economics.  
The focus this note is on is that narrow window of time and key experiments that set the 
stage for the subsequent developments. Public Choice and constitutional political economy 
played an indirect, but very important part through the perspective that Buchanan and Tullock 
brought to the theory of public sector decisions. The importance of the “rules of the process” had 
an enormous influence on the development of laboratory experimental methods. As someone 
who was deeply associated with the transition from the very first, I appreciate the opportunity to 
report on the subtle ways in which public choice theory contributed to the basic science and my 
participation along the way. 
 
 
Background 
The relationship between Public Choice and the development of laboratory experimental 
methods reflects a natural confluence of events, perspectives, and methods. In the mid-1960s, a 
mathematical question posed by Jim Buchanan attracted my interest and ultimately evolved into 
a theory that motivated several of the key experiments. Mr. Buchanan, which is how one 
addressed him at the University of Virginia those days, was perplexed by the Samuelson 
conditions for the Pareto Optimal provision of public goods. He asked about the conditions for 
Pareto optimality in a world that existed of only public goods. The Samuelson conditions 
required the existence of a private good held by everyone. It was used to measure the individual 
marginal values of the public good, which were then summed. Due to the absence of a private 
good, the technical conditions for Pareto optimality in the “all public goods” case required 
generalization. In retrospect, one can see that Jim’s thoughts were exploring the demand side of 
the provision of public goods.  
 As a graduate student, I became interested in the problem and managed to solve it 2 and 
while working on the problem, I noticed that the conditions for Pareto optimality are closely 
related to the conditions for a particular notion of voting equilibrium under unanimity in a world 
of public goods. A special type of dynamics was also suggested. The equilibrium notion 
postulated a process of proposals and movements in the world of public goods, along directions 
that would pass the voting test (not fail a unanimous vote) and would stop at equilibrium when 
no movement was possible. The proposal and movement process, which employs a search of the 
actions to which participants might agree, is different from the classical Nash model in which 
each participant optimizes given the decision function of others. The gradient of the utility 
                                                      
2  Soon after I developed conditions for Pareto optimality in a world of public goods, I discovered that similar 
conditions had been developed years earlier by Ragnar Frisch. (Frisch (1959)). 
 
 
function and directional derivatives became the engines of decisions as opposed to marginal rates 
of substitution.  Positive votes required positive increases in utility in the sense that an indifferent 
individual would vote “no”. Of course, an idea of an equilibration process for elections had been 
used by Anthony Downs 3 and Duncan Black had considered equilibrium for committees4, but 
the precise theory I used was new.  
 Seeing the conditions as characterizing equilibria for one set of voting institutions 
(unanimity), my attention turned to the same notion of equilibrium under other voting rules. 
Subsequently, I published conditions for a theory of equilibrium under majority rule in a world 
of public goods5.  I also considered how proposals for changes in public goods levels might be 
found systematically from among the infinity of possibilities.6  Interestingly, the existence of the 
equilibrium is very fragile and the equilibrium disappears with small preference changes or if 
private goods are added to the environment. That fragility motivated experiments that came later. 
An Invitation for Laboratory Experimental Methods 
The connections between public choice and experiments reflect a general, scientific 
methodological assumption that leads from theory to experiment. Public choice theory rests on a 
set of general principles, much like the laws of supply and demand, which are assumed to 
operate independent of time, place, individuals, and many other variables. The perspective that 
purposeful and possibly self- interest could drive public decisions contrasts with the view that 
public decisions are driven only by normative views about what is good for society. The public 
choice perspective, now more properly viewed as the constitutional political economy 
                                                      
3 Anthony Downs (1957).  
4 Duncan Black (1958); Duncan Black and R. A. Newig (1998). 
5 Charles R. Plott (1967(a)). This paper also contains the results regarding unanimity that first attracted my attention 
to the problems. 
6 Charles R. Plott, (1967(b)). 
 
 
perspective, suggests that an understanding of the public sector can be achieved through a study 
of how self-interest works within a given set of institutions, as opposed to a study of alternative 
philosophies of public preferences that might exist apart from the preferences of the individual. 
Public Choice theory is behavioral in the sense that public decisions are assumed to reflect 
equilibrating tendencies resulting from the interactions among individuals and institutions. The 
theoretical and empirical challenges are to identify and understand the principles at work. 
 The behavioral principles of public choice follow the methodological individualism of 
economics and are shaped by the interaction of individual preferences and institutions to 
determine social choices.  The relationship is summarized by a “fundamental equation” that 
plays a background methodological role in the development and application of experimental 
methods.7 The relation is simply: 
Preferences x institutions x feasible set x solutions/equilibrium => outcomes. 
The equation summarizes a hypothesis that the principles that determine public (and private) 
sector decisions and outcomes are located in individual preferences over outcomes, the 
institutions that control their information, the actions from which individuals can choose, and the 
physical environment that limits feasible options. By including a concept of equilibrium or 
solution concepts from game theory or equilibrium concepts from economics and public choice, 
the outcomes of the both the private and public sectors can be predicted.  Models of markets, 
politics and games all fit within the same framework. 
                                                      
7 While elements of the “fundamental equation” are evident in early writings of Public Choice, its importance as a 
foundation element in the development of experimental methods was only becoming recognized as laboratory 
experimental methods developed. See, Charles R. Plott (1979). Several papers related to the development of this 
period are reprinted in Charles R. Plott (2001).  
 
 
 
 Theories reflecting the structure of the fundamental equation are well suited for 
experimental methods. The key assumptions of such theories are based on observables and can 
be implemented in simple cases for the purposes of study and testing. (i) The commodity space 
can be any abstract set of variables. (ii) The theory takes no stand on the sources or shapes of 
preferences or the reasoning through which preference might emerge.  The theory does not take a 
stand on why an individual has a preference. For example, the preference for a shirt could be 
driven by a desire to stay warm, because someone admired wore something similar, because it 
might attract a member of the opposite sex or because the buyer wants to eat it.   The theory only 
depends on the existence of preferences and places no restrictions on the source of preference.  
Thus, preferences can be induced using money or any other reward medium the people like and 
can have the structure of private goods, private goods with externalities or public goods.8 (iii) 
The institutions can be markets, voting, and negotiation or can be more bureaucratic or 
administrative processes. (iv) Feasibility can be directly controlled. In essence, key parameters 
can be held constant while institutions are changed, thereby facilitating a deep understanding of 
solutions and equilibrium and related impacts of institutions, the substance of public choice and 
constitutional political economy. Because the framework applies to both the public sector and the 
private sector, the fundamental equation brings a generality to experimental methods that did not 
exist before. For example, an experiment can include private markets but it also can include 
economic environments where private markets cannot operate. 
                                                      
8 The demonstration by Grether and Plott (1979) that preference theory could be rejected by “preference reversal” 
experiments performed in psychology expanded the study to include a variety of preference forms together with the 
possibility that preferences might be endogenous. The Grether and Plott study was an important step in expanding 
the study because it clearly demonstrated that preference theory as found in economics is a rejectable theory, as 
opposed to tautological and thus, placed the body of theory on solid scientific footing.  
 
 
 The generality of theories as captured by the fundamental equation forms the rationale 
and the relevance of laboratory experimental methods. General theories, by definition, apply to 
simple and special cases as well as to complex and common cases. Thus, theory applies with 
equal force to cases that evolve naturally from historical events and cases that were created 
specifically for laboratory testing. The simple cases that can be created in the laboratory can thus 
be used to explore the reliability of the theory and make needed comparisons among competing 
theories. Of course, it does not follow that the results from laboratory conditions can be applied 
directly to complex naturally occurring environments in which parameters are unknown and 
institutions are possibly different from those induced in the laboratory. The transfer of laboratory 
results to field environments is delicate in the case of public choice, just as it is delicate in the 
natural sciences. 
Foundation Experiments: Identifying Principles 
Public Choice theory suggests relationships among a broad spectrum of institutions that can be 
explored and refined through experimental methods. This process of discovery often begins with 
specific experimental questions and asks if the data produced through experiments is consistent 
with theory, given a best case setting for the theory. If the theory has empirical content given its 
best shot, a process of extension and refinement to other institutions is initiated. While narrow 
support for a theory in a specific laboratory environment is part of the experimental method, the 
method also looks for similarities across environments as sources of support and refinement. 
1.  William H. Riker and Minimum Winning Coalitions 
If the defining features of public choice and constitutional political economy are the roles of 
institutions and self-interest as the driving forces of public sector behavior, then the first 
 
 
experiments can be attributed to William Riker (Riker, 1967, Riker and Zavoina, 1970). His 
methods and theory were influenced by game theory and the study of coalitions in games, 
including experiments in sociology and psychology. His use of laboratory experimental methods 
was a natural step towards developing what he viewed as positive political theory as opposed to a 
normative approach based on political philosophy. 
 His focus was a three person bargaining and coalition formation in a “divide a dollar” 
task, a game with transferrable utility. He studied whether or not the theory of minimal winning 
coalitions would receive support as opposed to alternative theories of political behavior based 
political philosophy and the possible suppression of self-interest to norms of behavior and group 
cohesion. He wondered if self-interest was a model of behavior that could be considered 
seriously along with models based on the psychology, sociology, and attitudes that would be 
called other regarding preferences in today’s terminology. He studied negotiations within 
political institutions in which a coalition of two agents was sufficient to determine the allocation 
in a three person group. His results are the first to demonstrate the power of the main simple, 
Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. His experiments clearly demonstrated that the principles of 
minimal winning coalitions could survive the test of simple environments and in doing so set the 
stage for the study of more complex environments. 
 The contrast of Riker’s experiments with those conducted later is instructive. When 
Riker’s experiments were at the formative stage neither the generality of public choice theory nor 
modern, laboratory experimental methods had emerged. The differences between voting theory 
with public goods and games in characteristic form were not recognized. Well established 
distinctions between a game with transferrable utility, which places a private good into the game, 
and those without transferrable utility, had not been fully developed. Riker’s experiments were 
 
 
based on transferrable utility and thus private goods, as opposed to public goods. Similarly, the 
possibility of inducing preferences for an abstract pattern of public goods was completely 
unknown as was the logic that would motivate such methodology. Riker did not study the detail 
of voting rules, and given his parameters majority rule equilibrium did not exist.  
Of course, the absence of details that became known later does not detract from his 
contribution. His experiments were steps toward introducing experiments with game theory into 
political science, and toward demonstrating that positive political science was possible. In 
addition, he created a presumption that self-interest and individual optimizing behavior could 
play a role in the collective decision process as opposed to theories based solely on individual’s 
regards for others. Not only did he legitimize the question, his results suggested the answer. 
2.  Committee Experiments:  Equilibration  
The committee experiments of Fiorina and Plott9 first conducted in the fall of 1972, represent a 
transition in substance and methods. Their experimental setting was a world of public goods of 
the type I had studied theoretically, which differed substantially from previously conducted 
experiments with markets and games.  In addition, new experimental methods were developed to 
accommodate the Fiorina and Plott discovery that a theory, which was expected to have no 
explanatory power even under the best of conditions, is actually very powerful. At the time of the 
discovery, theories of public choice were not developed with the precision needed for 
experimental testing and of course, no history of similar experiments existed on which to build. 
New methods were required to pursue the implications of the discovery. 
                                                      
9 Morris P. Fiorina and Charles R. Plott (1978). 
 
 
 The new experimental methods developed by Fiorina and Plott reflected hints found in 
the experimental methods developed in the early 1960’s and used by Vernon Smith to study 
markets (1962,1964).  Smith employed monetary incentives to induce preferences10 over private 
goods. However, public goods and associated institutions differ dramatically from private goods, 
especially in a world where private goods and bilateral trades do not exist. The study of 
committees and public choice required a substantial generalization of the methodology of 
induced values in order to accommodate the wide ranging motivations and institutions that the 
theory includes.   
The methods developed by Smith were based on each person having values for only a single unit 
of a single good11 and required that the relationship between money and the unit exchanged was 
necessarily quasi linear.  The value of the single unit could only be positive (no satiation). The 
experiments were based on the concept of exchange between two people that could take place 
without the knowledge or interest of others (no forced consumption and no capacity for multiple 
party agreements).   
 A world of public goods has none of the convenient features that support the use of 
experiments with private goods. A new approach to preference inducement was needed.  Not 
only do institutions and procedures differ from markets, the properties of preferences that can 
                                                      
10 Induced value refers to the use of money to induce preferences for an abstract set of options. The resulting 
preferences over abstract options become parameters for models applied to the choice from the options.  
11 Fred Williams (1973) attempted to expand the method to multiple units but could do so only through the use of a 
special trading process. Similarly, a 1973 Purdue dissertation by Harvey Reed attempted to study the two unit case 
but inadvertently found it necessary to change the trading process. The induced preference method had not been 
generalized to deal with multiple markets and certainly not with complements and substitutes among variables. The 
issue can be made clear through a comparison of preference inducement in the market experiments of Vernon Smith 
(1962) and Vernon Smith (1964) with the generalization placing value on marginal changes associated with multiple 
units in a single market introduced at Plott and Smith (1978), or the generalization to preference interdependence in 
multiple markets (Forsyth, Palfrey, and Plott, (1982)). 
 
 
 
exist in a world of public goods are completely different from those that exist in markets. 
Properties of public goods include multiple units, negative marginal utilities (public goods are 
not always good), possible non-convex preferences and synergies that can lead to complements. 
Other regarding preferences, including attitudes or fairness, can be at work.  In general, the 
inducement methods cannot depend on the existence of the private good needed for quasi linear 
utility implementation.  In a world of public goods, all individuals “consume” the amount of the 
goods that exist so the commodity space must be such that a change in the consumption by one 
person is accompanied by an identical and simultaneous consumption change by all. Indeed, 
considerable research had focused on the technology and commodity space of public goods, 
externalities and the exclusion principle (Meyer and Plott, 1975).  Furthermore, multiple parties 
are participants in changes so institutions require discussions of options so a common language 
must exist to support communication about options.  
 The new experimental methodology is deceptively simple and is illustrated in Figure 1. 
The possible alternatives (the commodity space) are the points in the two dimensional plane. All 
preferences are induced for the points on this commodity space (the plane) which is common to 
all participants.  That is, if the existing option is some point x on the plane, then all preferences 
(payoffs) are evaluated at x.  For example, consider a single individual who has the preference 
induced by the dot at the far left in Figure 1(the approximate point is (25,72)). For any individual 
with the preference represented by that dot, the point (25,72) is the most preferred alternative 
from among all possibilities.  If the alternative (25,72) is the group choice then the individual 
who has the preference would receive the cash represented by the dot, say $50.00, which would 
be known to that individual and no one else. If, for example, the individual’s preference for 
alternatives decreases with distance from the optimal, then the indifference curves would be 
 
 
concentric circles centered on the optimal. Each indifference curve could be given a label 
indicating the amount of money the individual would receive if the group choice is a point on the 
indifference curve. So long as the group decisions are restricted to the points on the plane, no 
side payments, deals for meeting afterward or physical threats, the individual’s preferences for 
the points on the plane are induced and known.  
 Since the points on the plane are public goods, the “consumption” is the same for all 
participants but individual preferences for those points need not be the same.  A point on the 
plane chosen by the group is the same point for all, and all but different preferences can be 
induced for different individuals. That is, if the group choice is say (40,70), then all participants 
get the payment indicated by their personal, induced preference at the point (40,70). The 
commodity space is common to all subjects, so all “consume” the same quantity of the public 
goods, but all can assess that quantity according to their own value using their private utility 
map, which can differ across individuals.  Differing preferences induce the natural conflict 
among people regarding the choice of the public goods.  Notice that the structure does not 
depend on the classical notion of a characteristic function from the theory of cooperative games.  
The decision by the group is experienced by all and there is no natural way of punishing those 
not in a coalition or excluding non-members from the benefits of a coalition.  Thus, the structure 
of a public goods environment is different from the structure of a cooperative game without side 
payments. 
 Several features are worth note. First, the incentive sheets are independent so payoffs can 
be private and the level of payoffs can differ dramatically across subjects, even with the same 
preference by simply choosing different monetary magnitudes to attach to indifference curves.  
Indeed, while money is convenient, the source of motivation need not be the same across 
 
 
subjects as long as it is something that is an adequate, positive reward from the point of view of 
the subject.  Payoffs need not be convex or continuous. Multiple units of multiple goods can be 
the studied. Indifference curves can be any shape desired for purpose of the experiment. 
Marginal utilities can be flat, positive or negative, since public goods need not be good. The 
public goods can be complements with synergies, substitutes or reflect lexicographic 
preferences.  
 For emphasis, the reader should notice that no private goods exist in the example in 
Figure 1 and that preferences are induced for multiple units of two public goods. Five people are 
to choose levels of the two public goods and conflict exists among them. Prior to this technique, 
experiments without private goods had not been conducted and there had been no market 
experiments with multiple commodities and multiple units of commodities. Such features were 
not possible given the experimental techniques that had been used in economics or in political 
science. 
 The new environment and theory created new challenges that Fiorina and Plott met by 
changes in the experimental techniques but also changes in the application of and logic of 
experimental methodology. The traditional experimental methodology of theory testing and 
rejection seemed incapable of moving the theory in useful ways. The abstractness and fragility of 
the theory combined with the absence of operational constraints and institutional detail made the 
theory a trivial target for rejection. It was easy to imagine experiments in which the theory could 
be rejected. Other general theories of group decisions found in psychology and game theory were 
similarly vague or incomplete and thus suffered from the same vulnerability. Simple theory 
rejection seemed to give little insight about any explanatory power that might exist and how it 
might be improved by experimental methods. The methodology of “theory test” experiments 
 
 
relied on the existence of theories that were much more precise than the public choice and 
political theories available at the time. 
 The challenges were overcome through two methodological changes.  First, the 
experimental approach was inverted from the traditional “theory first” method to a 
“data/phenomena” first method. The traditional approach starts with theory, implements 
experimental controls that satisfy the conditions of the theory, and then asks whether or not the 
theory is true or false. By contrast, the Fiorina and Plott approach started with an experimental 
environment constructed to study simple cases of phenomena that public choice theories were 
attempting to explain.  The logic that supported the use of experiments was simple and directed 
by the “fundamental equation”. General theories should work in simple and special cases. The 
purpose of an experiment is to take a look and assess what, if any, of the phenomena the model 
captures. The idea is that if the models fail to “work adequately” in the easiest cases, then one 
would not expect them to work to explain more complex cases. On the other hand, success when 
applied to the easy is an invitation to explore theory generalization and increasing experimental 
complexity.   
Given the experimental environment, the second methodological change was an 
empirical focused on which of several models might produce the best explanation for the data, 
even though the experimental controls might not meet the assumptions of any of the models. It is 
a contest among theories as opposed to the test of a theory and allowed research to expand as 
guided by the most promising models while remaining consistent with a set of basic principles. 
The phenomena chosen for study were the decisions of committees that operated with specific, 
well defined rules in which participants had well-formed preferences about a set of options 
without uncertainties and without information about the preferences of others. Multiple models 
 
 
reasonably could be applied to such an experiment so rather than studying the prediction of one 
theory, they computed the predictions of many theories. The question was changed from “is the 
theory true” to “which theory/model best explains the data”12, and how the model might be 
improved. This change required developing a technique for determining the “best” from among 
several competing theories.  
 The mathematical elegance of equilibrium theory suggested that generalizations were 
possible but such generalizations would not be of interest if the equilibrium theory could not 
work under the best of conditions. Scientific interest in the theory and any of its generalizations 
would be dictated by the experimental results as opposed to its logic or potential applications that 
might be imagined. That was a new type of argument that flowed directly from the methodology 
implicit in the fundamental equation. In addition, the public goods environment permitted 
experiments that simultaneously tested many competing theories13 and also set the stage for the 
study of the broad range of public choice institutions and theory that exist outside the world of 
private goods and markets. 
 The Fiorina and Plott experiments and subsequent extensions, demonstrate the existence 
of an equilibration process in voting groups. Figure 1-A contains an illustration with five voters 
and circular indifference curves centered at a dot encircled by a typical indifference curve. The 
world is one with only public goods. A unique voting equilibrium exists at the maximum for the 
individual located at the interior of the Pareto Optimal points. Early experimental work focused 
on both the voting procedures and the underlying structure of the alternatives. If the voting 
                                                      
12 The approach is influenced by Bayesian methods in the sense that it is not meaningful to reject a theory without 
having an alternative. However, the absence of a theory of error structure presented a special challenge. 
13 The Fiorina and Plott experiment tested sixteen competing behavioral models within the single experimental 
setting.  Several of the theories were found in the social psychology and sociology literature.  Others were found in 
the political science literature and still others were found in the Public Choice and Economics literatures. 
 
 
follows a form of Roberts Rules of Order and if underlying set of alternatives has a spatial 
structure in which the equilibrium exists, then the committee decisions accumulate near the 
equilibrium as shown in Figure 1-B. The tendency of equilibration illustrated in the figure has 
been replicated many times and under a variety of preference configurations. The experiments 
demonstrate that a principle of equilibration exists in such environments. 
 The discovery that an equilibration tendency could be observed in an experimental 
environment led to an explosion of ideas even though the equilibration had been observed in 
only a narrow class of environments. The result suggested the need for many different 
experiments to explore the robustness of the phenomena and the sensitivity to institutions. The 
broad ranges of public choice questions were immediately open. The implications the 
fundamental equation are unbounded and new possibilities were exposed. Figure 2 contains a 
self-explanatory map of experiments proposed in the Fiorina and Plott proposal to the National 
Science Foundation developed in the summer and fall of 1973 and submitted late that fall.14 It is 
interesting to note that a large part of the proposed research was related to experimental 
procedures and methods.  However, an equally large part was focused on institutions, which 
clearly reflected the influence of Jim Buchanan and what would be latter be called the 
constitutional political economy strand of Public Choice research. 
 Of course, the fragility of existence of the equilibrium was an invitation to theory 
refinement and additional experiments. Fiorina and Plott studied the case where no equilibrium 
exists by moving the maximum of the person at the equilibrium in Figure 1-A slightly down and 
to the right. The outcomes in the resulting non-equilibrium experiments found a clustering of 
                                                      
14 The initial experiments were all funded by an earlier NSF grant to C. Plott. By the spring of 1973, many of the 
Fiorina and Plott experiments were completed and the research was focused on new directions.  
 
 
outcomes similar to the equilibrium experiments, albeit the outcome cluster of the non-
equilibrium experiments was broader than the equilibrium experiments. Nevertheless, the 
outcomes were not scattered throughout the possibilities and thus, suggested the existence of 
some as yet unformulated equilibrium/solution concept. None of the existing theories worked 
well to predict what happens, a fact that created a challenge.15 
 What theory describes outcomes when the equilibrium does not exist? Many theories and 
tests have emerged over the intervening decades. Among the first that attempted to replicate the 
Fiorina and Plott results and generalize the theory to cover the cases of non- equilibrium was 
developed by Richard McKelvey and Peter Ordeshook16 who also explored parliamentary 
procedures such as an accumulation of amendments and associated votes before voting on a 
single motion. Their model draws heavily on classical cooperative game theory in which 
coalition formation is a central feature of group decision. Like Riker, the McKelvey and 
Ordeshook, “competitive solution” has coalitions forming and coordinating to achieve a purpose 
while minimizing concessions to those whose agreement is not needed for achieving the goal. As 
a prediction, the competitive solution presents a challenge in terms of uniqueness but in the 
                                                      
15 The case of non-equilibrium was not studied until after September 1973 when the first agenda experiments were 
conducted.  Both Mo and I wanted to do the non-equilibrium environment but could not find a justification in terms 
of an understanding for what would be learned.  In frustration, Mo asserted “If we move the equilibrium and if the 
data just follow the maximum of the interior person, it would be very embarrassing.”  That comment together with 
the agenda theory, which had just been exposed by the flying club exercise of Levine and Plott (1978), supplied a 
theory.  If the agent in the center proposed his/her maximum at some point, a plausible agenda step exits that could 
lead to the point. Thus, the agenda experiments provided a theory about what might be expected if the equilibrium 
did not exist. It was the justification we were seeking and the experiments were conducted. Interestingly, exactly 
why we were excited about the research was not obvious to everyone. Vernon Smith arrived at Caltech in the fall of 
1973 and, after observing what Mo and I we were doing, asked me in a somewhat rhetorical tone, why we were 
doing such research, which was obviously dramatically different from what had taken place in economics and made 
little sense to him at the time. Mo and I knew that we were going to have a difficult time explaining what we were 
doing to a very skeptical audience. Vernon’s comment suggested that it would be harder than we anticipated.  
Except for those very close to public economics and public choice the source of excitement and curiosity was not 
obvious. 
16 J.E. Berl, Richard D. McKelvey, Peter C. Ordeshook, and M. D. Winer (1976). 
 
 
experiments for which clear predictions could be deduced, the data follow the patterns 
predicted17. 
3.  Alternative voting rules: The power of Veto 
Both the Fiorina and Plott results and the McKelvey and Ordeshook results suggest that 
successful models focus on winning and blocking coalitions in relation to pairs of alternatives. 
That fact is clear in retrospect now, after decades of experiments. The principle that operates can 
be seen in the power of the veto. An alternative x dominates an alternative y if a winning 
coalition unanimously prefers x to y. A blocking coalition is a subset of all winning coalitions 
and thus, has “veto power” in the sense that x does not dominate y if the blocking coalition is not 
unanimous for x over y. The outcomes predicted by the model are the undominated alternatives, 
which always exists if blocking coalitions exists. 18 
 Unanimity as a voting rule places all voters in the position of a veto player. No doubt this 
is the feature that made the process attractive for Buchanan. His continuous exploration of such 
rules over the years served to give the method of unanimity high priority in experiments. Figure 
3 adapts the environment typically used in the study of majority rule by a simple change of the 
voting rule from majority rule to unanimity. The status quo from the majority rule committees is 
retained as are the other procedures. The only change is that the final vote and amendments to a 
motion on the floor must be accepted by a unanimous vote as opposed to a majority. The notion 
of equilibrium used in majority is also defined in terms of a point from which no change can 
receive the needed vote. The data are shown in the Figure 3. All outcomes are in the set of Pareto 
                                                      
17 Richard. D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook (1978).  See also, James D. Laing and Scott Olmsted (1978).  
18 Early experiments pitted a Von Neumann – Morgenstern solution against the core. The issue was whether the VM 
solution captured data that the core would not. In particular, the experiments are asking if coalition theories had 
predictive power over equilibrium theories. If the committee operates by rules similar to Robert’s Rules, the answer 
is no.  
 
 
optima. Inefficient decisions are never made. Interestingly, the data are clustered near the center 
of the Pareto Optima19. The reason for the attraction to the center is unknown. While the default 
outcome is important, both fairness and expectations about what others might accept are 
speculations about the underlying principle that operates.  
 The power of the general model is easily illustrated by committees that operate under 
closed rule, in which a specific individual or subcommittee has the power to prevent votes on 
alternatives.20 However, the individual or subcommittee cannot implement any alternative unless 
joined by a majority. The members of such a subgroup are viewed as “veto players” in the sense 
that x cannot be chosen over y if the coalition of veto players does not unanimously prefer x over 
y. In the language of the theory, y is not dominated by x. A set of alternatives that has the 
property of being “undominated”, the core of an appropriately defined cooperative game without 
side payments, tends to attract the outcomes of committee choices. 
 In Figure 4, the individual at the right of the figure has the power to prevent votes on any 
proposal but cannot make proposals and a proposal cannot win unless it is accepted by a majority 
of those voting. The voter is a veto player. The majority rule equilibrium without the veto player 
is the point in the center of the Pareto Optima as was represented in Figure 1-A but in Figure 4 
the core of a social choice game without side payments, the undominated alternatives, are those 
that exist on the connecting the majority rule equilibrium and the maximum for the veto player.  
The core is closely related to the concept of an equilibrium in the sense that in the cooperative 
game model the coalition of the whole cannot be organized to support a move and in the 
equilibrium model a coalition need not be formed to block a move because a prosed change will 
                                                      
 
20 The closed rule was first studied experimentally in R. Mark Isaac and Charles R. Plott (1978). 
 
 
not receive a unanimous vote with voter voting independently. As can be seen, the committee 
choices are scattered in the direction of the core. Thus, the shift to what is effectively the closed 
rule also shifts the equilibrium from the single point to the line segment. Notice that the 
undominated options, the core, become an effective model of committee choices. The use of veto 
players can be extended to capture complex political systems and experiments support the model 
as effectively predicting group choice. It is important to note that if the set of options contains 
cycles, the most preferred alternative of the veto player is always in the core and if the cycles are 
sufficiently numerous the core shrinks to the optimum of the veto player. In that sense, the veto 
player has considerable power. That fact also answers a long-standing question about the absence 
of observed cycles in ongoing political systems. If veto players exist, then an equilibrium always 
exists. This fact also addresses questions about the fragility of the majority rule equilibrium. 
Frequently observed features of systems can add stability to the system. 
4.  Agenda Theory and Design as a Method and Purpose 
The results from spatially embedded committee processes operating under versions of Roberts 
Rule suggest optimism that some general principles from cooperative game theory operates to 
determine the outcomes of all committee processes. Unfortunately, agenda theory dashes such 
hopes. While the core of the appropriate game is an extremely powerful model for some 
environments the agenda experiments demonstrate that the power does not extend to all 
environments. 
 An agenda is a sequence of partitions of the alternatives produced by a series of agenda 
questions. For example, if the set of options is {A,B,C,D}, the first question could pose a choice 
between the sets {A,B} and {C,D}.  The second question would apply to the chosen set and ask 
which of the two options will be selected as a final choice. Language is sufficiently versatile to 
 
 
induce very natural sounding agenda. For example, the proposal to “consider the extremes first” 
pits the set {A,D} against the set {B,C}. The outcome of the deliberations will differ according 
to the sequence of proposals. Agenda theory suggests that the alternative finally selected can be 
substantially determined by a properly designed agenda. It is important to recognize that this 
power of the agenda is unrelated to voting cycles. 
 The power of this theory to influence groups was first discovered by Plott and Levine and 
research in both experimental environments and in a field application in which a large flying 
club was influenced to buy a fleet of planes preferred by the person in charge of the agenda.21 
The application had two impacts. First, it demonstrated the power of public motivated theories 
when applied to complex, “real world” controversies and the central role of experiments in such 
applications.  Secondly, it changed the institutions on which the theory was focused. 
 The fact that the influence of the agenda does not depend on voting cycles is underlined 
by the fact that it can exert systematic influence even when all members of the group have the 
same preference over alternatives. The theory works by keeping voters in the dark at every stage, 
not revealing what might be the outcome of the vote in subsequent stages and preventing 
discussions and straw votes that reveal what might happen in subsequent stages. Voters tend to 
be a bit random between being optimistic, expressing their preference for the set with their most 
preferred option, and pessimistic, voting against the set that contains their least preferred. This 
randomness together any diversity of preferences that might exist in the group, can be used to 
fashion the agenda such that at each stage of voting the options not preferred by the agenda 
designer are eliminated. The objective is to have only the option preferred by the designer 
remains after the voting.  
                                                      
21 See Michael E. Levine and Charles R. Plott (1977); and Michael E. Levine and Charles R. Plott (1978). 
 
 
 Thus, agenda experiments demonstrate that the undominated alternatives that are such a 
powerful model in the spatial environment with Roberts Rules of Order cannot be applied with 
abandon. The agenda theories demonstrate that naturally appearing agenda, if imposed, can 
induce voting groups to choose almost anything. Thus, procedures can be used to cause 
outcomes to be different from the core or any other game solution. 
 Agenda research also created a methodological advancement. In particular, the research 
introduces the methodology of design in which the research purpose is not only the testing of 
theory but is also asking if institutions can be designed to serve some purpose and if so, what 
might be the role of experiments. The key steps to creating a useful methodology are explicitly 
used by Levine and Plott. Clearly, the power of institutional design was known to public choice 
and axiomatic social choice scholars long before the modern theory of mechanism design was 
introduced.  Indeed, the constitutional political economy strand of public choice emerged 
because of an understanding of the power of institutional choice.  
The early public choice experiments also produced a successful methodology.  In today’s 
language, the steps are: (1) Does the mechanism do what it is supposed to do – proof of 
principle; and (2) Does it do it for the right reasons - those that led to the design – design 
consistency. That approach was explicitly used in explaining the role of the agenda experiments. 
5.  Externalities and Public Goods Provision: Efficiency Measures and the Intersection of Public 
and Private Sectors 
 In a world of only public goods, there are no efficiency measures other than Pareto 
Optimality and if the institutions contain veto players the outcomes will tend to be Pareto 
Optimal.  Measures of gains from trade require a private good and thus the efficiency 
 
 
measurement of institutional performance in an experiment requires a private good. The modern 
measurement of efficiency in an experiment was discovered and applied to classical market 
environments by Plott and Smith (1978). Their measure of efficiency is the total gains from trade 
- the actual money gained by participants as a group divided by the highest total possible. Their 
measure allows experiments to assess the extent of “market failures” and responses to 
institutional changes. And, it can do so even if the theory responsible for the institutional impact 
is not understood. This insight allows assessment of institutions based on experiments even when 
the theoretical implications of competing institutions is not fully understood.  
Subsequent experiments demonstrated that markets can operate at near 100% efficiency 
in this sense, which stimulated the broad expansion of experiments on policy and market related 
institutional design. 
 Two primary theories of market failure, externalities and public goods, are often used to 
motivate public policy. Both follow from the hypothesis that preferences need not be “other 
regarding”. Externalities lead to market failure if people do not incorporate the damage done to 
others by their private behavior. Public goods provision fails because of the possibility of free 
riders, again a type of unresponsiveness to the preferences of others. Whether or not market 
failures actually exist or what might be done if failures do exist, depend on what is accepted 
about the pattern of preferences and the behaviors that follow. Neither introspection about own 
preferences nor historical examples seemed to produce evidence supporting generalization. 
 
 
 Very early experiments demonstrated that externalities produced in a market environment 
induced behavior substantially as theory predicted.22 Subjects participated in a traditional double 
auction but every trade by any trader created a penalty imposed on all others were penalized.  
The trade undertaken by any pair of participants created an externality (the penalty was a cost per 
unit traded by anyone in the market – a social cost) that applied to all others as soon as the trade 
took place.  The insight and experimental methodology was developed from the methods 
developed to study committees merged with the methods used to study markets.  The markets 
with externalities converged to the same competitive equilibrium as would have been the case if 
no externality had been imposed.  Because failure to trade can be interpreted as a contribution to 
the public good of penalty (social cost) reduction, the trades themselves can be interpreted as the 
first observations of the  “free rider” phenomena related to the theory of public goods.  
Experimental variations, imposing a tax and creating a permit corrected the externality as 
expected, raising efficiencies to near 100%, using the Plott-Smith measure of efficiency. The 
results have remained uncontroversial. 
 Research related to the provision of public goods emerged from multiple literatures with 
different presumptions about the problem, different methodologies and different theories. In all 
cases, the initial experiments suggest that public goods provisions are not characterized by total 
free riding and that the problem might not be as severe as theory suggests. Perhaps the first was 
Peter Bohm who approached the issue as a measurement problem and investigated the 
willingness of individuals to pay to watch a TV program.23 Different questions and 
                                                      
22 Charles R. Plott (1983). The paper was circulated as: Social Science Working Paper 180, California Institute of 
Technology, 1978. As was typical of experimental papers in those days it took years to get research published. 
23 Peter Bohm (1972). 
 
 
circumstances were examined. His general conclusion was the people are more willing to 
contribute than the literature would lead you to believe.  
Psychologist, Robin Dawes and colleagues initiated other experiments they interpreted as social 
dilemmas. A variety of institutions had unanticipated effects on contributions to a public good.24 
Group size, feedback, and instructions were varied in an attempt to find conditions that influence 
group contributions. While individuals had a dominate strategy to free ride, contributions 
persisted at significant, but inefficient, levels that could be influenced by procedures. 
Sociologists Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames also conducted experiments25 with the same overall 
pattern of results. Under the conditions of those experiments, people do not simply start free 
riding and stay there.  
 Economists attracted to the public goods problem seemed to start with the presumption 
that free riding would be frequent, if not pervasive, and concentrated on institutions and 
“mechanisms” that would induce the group to implement the optimal levels of public goods.  
J. Ferejohn, R. Forsythe, and R. Noll explored a mechanism to induce payments for public 
broadcasting programs.26 Vernon Smith examined several mechanisms for public goods 
provision.27 
 The studies of public goods provision mechanisms produced levels far above the zero 
level predicted by free riding.  However, these studies lacked any baseline that would establish 
the levels of public good provision that would occur in the absence of the mechanism.  In fact, 
                                                      
24Robin Dawes (1974); Robin Dawes, Jeanne McTavish, and Harriet Shaklee (1977). 
25 Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames (1979); Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames (1980); Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames 
(1981). 
26 J. Ferejohn, R. Forsythe, and R. Noll (1979). 
27 Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith (1978); Vernon L. Smith (1979); Vernon L. Smith (1980). 
 
 
substantial free riding on public goods provision had never been observed. The public goods 
provision mechanism studies demonstrated a possible solution to a problem that might not exist.   
Experiments were needed that could establish conditions under which free riding will be 
observed, if indeed such conditions exist.  Interestingly, even after years of theory that assumed 
the pervasive existence of free riding in the provision of public goods, the phenomena had not 
been experimentally observed.   
 A substantial research gap existed.  Theory predicted the existence of free riding.  Public 
goods provision mechanisms were constructed on the presumption that free riding needed 
correction.  Yet, free riding had not been observed and a body of opinion existed that suggested 
that free riding is against human nature and thus would never exist.  The experimental gap was 
filled by two studies focused on sufficient conditions to get free riding.  Isaac, McCue, and Plott 
were the first to observe public goods free riding.  Their experiments were motivated by intuition 
drawn from the public choice literature and behavior observed in markets with externalities. 
They studied an environment with different, declining values for a public good that must be 
sustained by repeated contributions28. Kim and Walker followed quickly and observed free 
riding in a similar environment. 29 In both cases, initial high levels of contributions declined 
rapidly to very low levels of contribution, which can be interpreted as free riding with occasional 
“pulses” in contributions as isolated individuals attempted to solve a problem what was oblivious 
to them but could do nothing about.  
                                                      
28 In essence, the needed conditions were already known from the behavior of markets with externalities.  A 
reduction in consumption or production of an external diseconomy is a contribution to the public good of external 
diseconomy reduction. Such contributions were not forthcoming in the externality experiments of Plott (1983) so the 
issue just turned on understanding the relationship between a positive contribution to the public good and the 
restraint of making a contribution to a public bad. 
29 R. Mark Isaac, K. McCue and Charles R. Plott (1985); O. Kim and Mark Walker (1984). 
 
 
These studies set the stage for tests of institutional solutions by discovering environments 
in which the natural level of public goods provision is low, thereby giving institutions a 
substantial hurdle to overcome. In the language used now, these environments can be used to 
“stress test” newly designed public goods provision mechanisms. The question posed was 
whether or not new types of institutions suggested by the Public Choice approach would 
successfully improve public goods provision in environments where public goods provision 
would not otherwise take place.  In the decades that followed, the experimental study of public 
goods mushroomed.  
6,  Policy Application of Laboratory Methods: Institutions for Airport Access 
Experimental methods in public choice passed another important landmark with the first 
application to an active policy issue.30 The development of agenda theory and the application to 
the flying club set the stage and proved feasibility of laboratory based policy research. The 
application to an on-going, politically charged policy issue demonstrated that the laboratory 
results could be (carefully) applied outside the laboratory and demonstrated by example of how 
that can be done when the scale is large and visible. The data from the laboratory related to 
theory in much the same way that data from the field related to theory. The theory itself made 
sense and was readily accepted by those close to the policy issue. Furthermore, the application 
established the capacity of the laboratory methods to withstand public scrutiny. That issues of 
institutional design would be present in the first policy applications of laboratory methods is not 
                                                      
30 An earlier policy application in economics was a paper by Hong and Plott (1982) who conducted a study on rate 
posting for the U.S. Department of Transportation. That study had an effect on the policy but the DOT did not 
publish the study due to the fear that Senator Proxmire would grant the DOT his “Golden Fleece” award for wasteful 
spending.  Interestingly, the long delay in the publication of this first application is not an isolated example of the 
difficulties getting early experimental work published. 
 
 
surprising. The design of institutions was a public choice theme from the beginning. Institutional 
comparisons were natural as was the use of efficiency measures as a norm of comparison.  
 The first application of experimental public choice methods following from the Fiorina 
and Plott experiments occurred during the process of airline deregulation in the mid-1970s. 
Airport’s access at four major airports was controlled by committees, “slot committees”, 
populated by the airlines that operated at the airport. The traditional function of these committees 
was coordinating the arrivals and departures of aircraft, the time “slots”. The number and general 
pattern of slots were authorized by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). Historically, the CAB 
allocated the rights to operate over routes, the scheduling of operations and setting of rates. 
Deregulation would remove CAB authority leaving the slot committees as the process for 
determining airport access. The CAB was concerned that the committees could function as a 
barrier to entry and perhaps also as a facilitating device for deeper anti-competitive activities. 
The power of the procedures used by the committees had been fully demonstrated by the Levine 
and Plott flying club example. 
 The CAB commissioned a study of the slot committees to determine how the committees 
functioned and to explore alternatives to the committees.31 The committees used the rule of 
unanimity to make decisions. The process started with proposals based historical allocations 
followed by concessions and changes proposed by the individual carriers. The report studied the 
committee procedures, deliberations, and decisions. From the study, it became clear that 
committee members believed that in the event of a failure to reach unanimity, the allocation of 
slots would be a political process that could involve members of Congress. It was also believed 
                                                      
31 David M. Grether and R. Mark Isaac (1979). The report was subsequently published as a book: David M. Grether, 
R. Mark Isaac, and Charles R. Plott (1989). 
 
 
that the default process would exert pressure on the large carriers to make slots available to new 
airline entrants and to smaller carriers. 
 The analysis of the slot committees involved experiments with committees operating 
under conditions similar to the slot committees and also involved experiments with 
recommended alternatives. The purpose of the experiments was to illustrate the nature of the 
underlying principles at work under the committee processes. Specifically, if the default is equal 
splits, then the core of unanimity voting game includes equal splits. The implication for 
committees with a pattern of initial endowment similar to the existing airline endowments is 
unambiguous. The larger holders give up slots to smaller participants.  
This implies that committee-based allocation can substantially reduce efficiency by 
inducing large, efficient holders to give up slots to small, inefficient holders. By contrast, 
efficiency calls for the efficient holders to grow in size while inefficient holders shrink. The 
committee experiments demonstrated the power of the core through experiments that 
manipulated endowments and efficiency and demonstrated that the committee choice was 
dictated only by the equilibrium. The process had no sensitivity to any dimension of efficiency. 
 Examination of data from multiple years of slot committee decisions demonstrated that 
the slots held by the large carriers were eroding over time. The slots given up by large carriers 
were transferred to new entrants. Committee discussions recorded as part of the study found a 
similar process as small carriers and midsized carriers, who had no interest in giving up slots to 
small carriers, pressured and threatened the larger carriers with the prospect that the larger 
carriers could suffer greater losses than those required to facilitate a unanimous choice. The fact 
that the larger carriers almost never grew and the smaller entrants were never denied a few slots 
 
 
suggested that the actual allocations were characterized by the inefficiencies predicted by theory 
and experimental evidence. Comparisons of experimental results to the actual committee 
decisions suggested that the same principles were at work in both places. Once the core was 
understood, its applicability became obvious. 
 The carriers immediately lost faith in the committees. The study recommended that the 
slots be auctioned or that existing carriers be grandfathered with slots bought and sold. The latter 
system ultimately replaced the committee system. The experimental auctions are of interest as 
the first combinatorial auctions and approached the allocation as a sequence of auctions. 
 
The Decades that Followed 
The first years of the 1970s were almost completely dominated by Public Choice experiments 
and were heavily influenced by theories of committees and social choice processes. A merger of 
public choice experiments with market experiments begins slowly in 1974 when Vernon Smith 
visited Caltech (1973/74) and then rapidly advances with new experiments applied to market 
uncertainty (Plott and Wilde (1982), information (Plott and Sunder, (1982, 1988), time 
interdependence (Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott (1982)) and institutions. Similarities in the 
importance of institutions in both markets and public choice (e.g. Nash equilibria and core – like 
principles together with their limitations) began to be recognized. At the same time, a second 
merger was taking place between public choice experiments and axiomatic social choice. The 
merger took axioms used to explore philosophies of social preference and reconstructed them in 
terms of the behavioral concept of a dominance relation of cooperative games without side 
payments. The new tools from social choice theory added solution concepts from cooperative 
 
 
game theory without side payments and facilitated the inclusion of institutions without the 
complicating detail required by non-cooperative games and Nash equilibrium (Plott, 1976). 
By the beginning of the 1980s, the interrelated disciplines of economics, political science, 
and public choice had a solid laboratory experimental foundation. Key principles had been 
established. The methodology of design and experimental testing as a policy exercise was 
understood and successfully applied. The few examples convincingly demonstrated that the basic 
research could ultimately produce value in applications.  The avalanche of research in the 
following decades was clearly anticipated by the early period of work. Public Choice and 
constitutional political economy remain at the center of the scientific developments. 
The development of experiments in the early 1970s was driven by curiosity about the 
power of institutions to shape collective choice, much of which was stimulated by the work of 
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock together with the broad issues of public choice and 
political science.  Paradoxically, in spite of his influence, experiments did not move to study 
Buchanan’s major interest: constitutional choice. How will individuals design and choose 
institutions and will participation in that process influence their behavior? The early experiments 
were narrowly focused on behavior within institutions given a fixed set of options and well-
formed individual preferences.  
Institutional preferences motivated by self-interest are understood and can be observed as 
individuals manipulate institutional designs to advance personal ends. However, the deep 
questions about the principles of behavior that operate at the level of constitutional choice remain 
open. The time and cost of such experiments might be a challenge, but intellectual and scientific 
promise loom large. How might an experiment avoid the regress of institutions to choose 
 
 
institutions? What preferences should be induced and what is the role of uncertainty? The 
thoughts of Jim Buchanan and the blossoming field of Constitutional Political Economy include 
many hypotheses about what the answers might be.   
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